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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
TRUSTS
USE OF DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE TO DETER-
MINE THE INTENT OF THE SETTLOR
The venerable rule that a man cannot make his right
heirs purchasers' seems still to apply in Indiana to convey-
ances of legal interests.2 In recent years this doctrine of
worthier title, in other jurisdictions, has been enunciated
most frequently in litigation involving trusts, and this litiga-
ton has centered in the courts of New York. New York's
experience, and particularly its failure to develop the rule
in such a way as to give some certainty to its law, has sig-
nificance for Indiana. For not only are New York's cases
repositories of much persuasive learning; they also illustrate
snares which the careful draftsman can avoid and the wise
court abolish.
On April 3, 1947, Jane Richardson served a notice of
revocation to the trustees of a trust of personal property
which she had established in 1924. The terms of the trust
were typical: they provided for the payment of the income
to the settlor, Jane, for life; and on her death the corpus
was to be paid over and delivered to such person or persons
as she might designate by her will. Failing such designation,
the corpus was to be paid to her mother, if living, and if
not living, then the corpus was to go to such persons as
would be entitled to the same under the intestacy laws of
the State of New York. The mother died in 1943 leaving
Jane as sole heir. At the time the notice of revocation was
served, Jane's husband and three children, two of whom
were infants and were therefore under legal disability, would
have been entitled to the trust corpus under the intestacy
laws of New York. The trustees contested the revocation
on the ground that Jane had created remainders to those
persons entitled to take her property in event of intestacy,
and that since the consent of these remaindermen had not
1. Pibus v. Milford, 1 Vent. 372, 86 Eng. Rep. 239 (1674); Read v.
Erengton, Cro. Eliz. 322, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594).
2. Dilman v. Fulwider, 57 Ind. App. 632, 105 N. E. 124 (1914);
Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N. E. 502 (1912);
Thompson v. Thompson, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314 (1904); Bate-
man v. Bennet, 31 Ind. App. 281, 66 N. E. 79 (1903); Brown
v. Bernhamer, 159 Ind. 539, 65 N. E. 580 (1902); McClanahan v.
Williams, 136 Ind. 30, 35 N. E. 897 (1893); Stilwell et ux. v.
Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880).
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been obtained she was not entitled to revoke the trust under
the applicable New York statute.8 Jane contended that un-
der the doctrine of worthier title she had retained a rever-
sion, was the only person beneficially interested, and there-
fore need not obtain the consent of any other person in
order to be entitled to revoke the trust. The New York Court
of Appeals reversed a ruling of the Appellate Division4 al-
lowing revocation, holding that the terms of the trust had
created remainders in Jane's next-of-kin. Richardson v.
Richardson, et al., 81 N. E.2d 54 (N. Y. 1948).
In New York, where the doctrine of worthier title seems
early to have been adhered to as a rule of property,5 there
was originally no difficulty in determining who were the
beneficiaries of a trust the terms of which directed that the
corpus be paid to the settlor's heirs or next of kin upon
termination of the particular estate. That doctrine, imported
into New York's law of trust without express discussion,
made such trust terms ineffective to create a remainder.
Rather the equitable conveyances left a reversion in the
settlor and that interest passed to his heirs or next of kin
by operation of law upon his death. Title thus derived by
the laws of descent or distribution was deemed "worthier"
than title derived by purchase, i.e., by conveyance.,
In 1919, Judge Cardozo's famous opinion in Doctor v.
Hughes7 indicated that the doctrine of worthier title would
no longer be adhered to as a rule of property preventing ab-
solutely a settlor from creating remainders in his heirs or
next of kin, if an intention to create a remainder is "clearly
3. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 23: "Upon the written consent of all
the persons beneficially interested in a trust of personal property
or any part thereof or hereafter created, the creator of such trust
may revoke the same as to the whole or such part thereof, and
thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease in the whole or
such part thereof."
4. Richardson v. Richardson et al., 272 App. Div. 321, 71 N. Y. S.2d
1 (1st Dep't 1947).
5. Williams v. Conrad, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 524 (1859); Buckley v.
Buckley, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 43 (1850).
6. Montague v. Curtis, 191 App. Div. 904, 181 N. Y. Supp. 709
1920); Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919);
see also Godolphin v. Abingdon, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Rep. 432
(1740); Godbold v. Freestone, 3 Lev. 406, 83 Eng. Rep. 753(1694). See also 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY 314 (1935); 125 A.
L. R. 548, 551 (1940).
7. 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
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expressed."8 Henceforth the doctrine has been applied in
New York as a rule of construction, serving to show the
intent of the settlor when that intent is not clearly to be
drawn from the terms of the trust. Indiana seems never to
have recognized the doctrine of worthier title as having any
application to equitable interests, either as a rule of property
or a rule of construction. But there is implicit authority for
the proposition that the doctrine is not a rule of property.9
Although voluntary trusts are presumed irrevocable un-
less the settlor expressly or impliedly has reserved a power
of revocation, one exception to this rule is recognized. A
settlor can revoke a trust with the consent of all the bene-
ficiaries provided none of them are under a legal disability
to give their consent.10  New York" and a few other states 2
have adopted this exception in statutory form. Thus when
a settlor attempts to revoke a trust containing provisions
that the corpus go to the settlor's next of kin at the termina-
tion of the particular estate, it becomes necessary to know
what persons are beneficially interested. Obviously, a revo-
cation may be effected more easily if the settlor has re-
served a reversion rather than created a remainder." It is
in arriving at a determination of what equitable interests
the trust instrument has created that the doctrine of worthier
8. Id., 122 N. E. at 222: "But at least the ancient rule survives to
this extent: That, to transform into a remainder what would
ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the transforma-
tion must be clearly expressed."
9. Ewing v. Jones, 130 Ind. 247 (1892). Where grantor conveyed
land in trust for grantor's maintenance for life and on his death
the property was to descend to the grantor's legal representatives,
excepting an adopted half brother, the court held that the grantor'slegal representatives took remainders by the trust deed. Their
permission was necessary before the trust could be revoked. How-
ever, the doctrine of "worthier title" was not mentioned in the
court's decision.
10. Botzum v. Havana National Bank, 367 Ill. 539, 12 N. E.2d 203(1937); Ewing v. Jones, 130 Ind. 247, 29 N. E. 1057 (1892);
Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 75 P.2d 132 (1938) ; Fredericks
v. Near, 260 Mich. 627, 245 N. W. 537 (1932). See also RE-
STATEMENT, TRuSTS § 338, 3 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 338 (penn. ed.
1939).
11. See note 3 supra.
12. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 7921 (1935); N. DAK. REv. CODE§ 59-0218 (1943); So. DAK. CODE § 59-0216 (1939).
13. If the settlor has retained a reversion and if he is also the lifebeneficiary, he does not need the consent of any other person in
order to revoke the trust. If another person is the life beneficiary,
his consent alone must be obtained by the settlor in order to
revoke the trust.
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title in those jurisdictions where it is effective becomes im-
portant. This problem of what persons are beneficially in-
terested in a trust corpus was the one presented to the
court in the Richardson case. Easy of formulation, the prob-
lem has proved difficult of solution, as is evidenced by a
wealth of cases.
The decision in Doctor v. Hughes'4 did not indicate what
factors in the trust instrument might be considered as clearly
expressing an intention to create a remainder to the settlor's
heirs. The leading case of Whittemore v. Equitable Trust
Co. of New York-5 was one of the first important cases pur-
porting to follow the rule of Doctor v. Hughes. In reality
the test used in the Whittemore case was an extension of the
rule. It was held that if the instrument as a whole evidenced
an intention of the settlor to make a complete disposition
of the entire estate at the time of the execution of the instru-
ment, it would follow that there was an intention to create
a remainder in the settlor's next of kin. This test has re-
mained of controlling significance in the New York courts.
Around the doctrine of Doctor v. Hughes and the Whitte-
more test the New York courts have built a sizable body of
law purporting to explain how a grantor's intention to create
a remainder or reversion may be determined. But that the
guiding principles are not yet clear is apparent from the con-
flict of opinion between the lower and highest appellate
courts of New York. Appellate Division cases have been
consistently overruled by the Court of Appeals16 or have
reached results seemingly inconsistent with the decisions
of that court.' T Factors which the Court of Appeals has con-
sidered indicative of an intention to create a remainder have
14. See note 7 supra.
15. 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
16. Richardson v. Richardson et al., 81 N. E.2d 54 (N. Y. 1948);
Matter of Scholz v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 295 N. Y.
488, 68 N. E.2d 503 (1946); Engel v. Guaranty Co., 280 N. Y.
43. 19 N. E.2d 673 (1939); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Miller, 278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E.2d 553 (1938); Whittemore v.
Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
17. Compare Beam v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 248 App.
Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1936) with Davis v.
City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 288 N. Y. Supp.
398 (1st Dep't 1936). These two cases with similar provisions
were decided on the same day. In the Beam case the reservation
of a testamentary power of appointment was found to be indica-
tive of a remainder, while in the Davis case the court found it
consistent only with a reversion,
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been construed by the Appellate Division to be indicative of
the retention of a reversion by the settlor.18
One of the factors which the courts consider of most
significance as showing an intention of the settlor to create
remainder interests in his heirs or next of kin is the reserva-
tion of a testamentary power of appointment. i9 The ground
for this conclusion is that the settlor intended to dispose of
all his property at the settling of the trust, retaining only
the right to designate new beneficiaries or to reapportion
the interests of old beneficiaries by will. Other factors
which have influenced a finding that the settlor intended to
create remainders in heirs are: (a) a conveyance in default
of. exercise of a testamentary power of appointment ;20 (b) a
direction to deliver corpus at the termination of the trust
to the appointees or heirs of an income beneficiary other
than the settlor ;21 (c) the absence of a reservation of a
power to grant or assign property during life ;22 (d) a dis-
18. Compare Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165
N. E. 454 (1929), with Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 254 App.
Div. 117, 3 N. Y. S.2d 1000 (1st Dep't 1938). In the Whittemore
case, the testamentary power of appointment was held to be a
strong factor consistent only with a remainder while in the Engel
case the court considered this factor to be only a superfluous
direction by the settlor to distribute the principal according to
law. Compare Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 260
N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932), with Kuntze v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 242 App. Div. 7, 272 N. Y. Supp. 883 (1st Dep't 1934). A
reversion of corpus to settlor at end of definite period of time
was held by the court to be indicative of a reversion in the former
case, while in the latter the same factor was present where the
court found that the settlor intended to create a remainder.
19. Richardson v. Richardson et al., 81 N. E.2d 54 (N. Y. 1948);
Hopkins v. Bank of New York, 261 App. Div. 465, 25 N. Y. S.2d
888 (1st Dep't 1941); Minc v. Chase Nat. Bank, 263 App. Div.
141, 31 N. Y. S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1941); Engel v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E.2d 673 (1939); Beam v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 182, 288 N. Y. Supp. 403(1st Dep't 1936); Hussey et al. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1st Dep't 1932); Whitte-
more v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
20. In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 69 N. Y. S.2d 235 (Spec.
Term 1947); Minc v. Chase National Bank of New York, 263 App.
Div. 141, 31 N. Y. S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1941); Hopkins v. Bank of
New York, 261 App. Div. 465, 25 N. Y. S.2d 888 (1st Dep't
1941).
21. Hussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 117, 258
N. Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dep't 1932); Corbett v. Bank of New York
& Trust Co., 229 App. Div. 570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't
1930).
22. Richardson v. Richardson et al., 81 N. E.2d 54 (N. Y. 1948);
Minc v. Chase National Bank of New York, 263 App. Div. 141,
?1 N, Y. S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1941); Engel v. Guaranty Trust
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posal of corpus other than by a reversion on the occurrence
of certain contingencies ;23 and (e) a provision for a class
of beneficiaries to take at a time other than upon the settlor's
death.24
The New York courts have also found reversions even
although the settlor retained a testamentary power of ap-
pointment.25 Justification for seemingly inconsistent results
may be found in the presence of additional factors in such
cases, consistent only with an intent to reserve a reversion.
Some of those factors have been: (a) provision for the return
of corpus to the settlor at end of a definite period of time ;26
(b) a disposition of the trust estate that did not dispose of
it finally, under all contingencies ;27 (c) retention by the
settlor of control over principal ;28 (d) the fact that the trust
had been set up expressly to provide for a particular obliga-
tion of the settlor, such as a separation settlement in a di-
vorce ;29 and (e) a direction to trustee to turn corpus over
to settlor's executor or estate upon his death.30  Thus the
Co. of New York, 280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E.2d 673 (1939); Schoell-
kopf v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 358, 196 N. E. 288
(1935); Hussey v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 236 App. Div.
117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Whittemore v. Equitable
Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
23. Richardson v. Richardson et al., 81 N. E.2d 54 (N. Y. 1948);
Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 43, 19 N. E.2d 673 (1939) ;
Schoellkopf v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 358, 196 N. E.
288 (1935); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298,
165 N. E. 454 (1929).
24. In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 69 N. Y. S.2d 235 (Spec.
Term 1947); Schoellkopf v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 267 N. Y.
358, 196 N. E. 288 (1935).
25. Fish v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. et al., 270 App. Div. 251, 59
N. Y. S.2d (1st Dep't 1945); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Miller, 278 N. Y. 134, 15 N. E.2d 553 (1938); Genesse Valley
Trust Co. v. Neuborn, 168 Misc. 703, 6 N. Y. S.2a1 498 (1938);
Davis v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 228
N. Y. Supp. 398 (1st Dep't 1936); Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank
& Trust Co., 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932).
26. Green v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 72 N. Y. S.2d 442 (1947);
Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 260 N. Y. 539, 184
N. E. 83 (1932).
27. Matter of Scholz v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 295 N. Y.
488, 68 N. E.2d 503 (1946).
28. Conroy v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 271 App. Div. 200, 62
N. Y. S.2d 926 (1st Dep't 1946); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust
Co., 162 App. Div. 607, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1058 (1st Dep't 1914).
29. Willis v. Willis et al., 265 App. Div. 746, 40 N. Y. S.2d 772 (1st
Dep't 1945).
30. St. George v. Fulton Trust Co., 273 App. Div. 516, 78 N. Y. S.2d
298 (1st Dep't 1948); Franklin v. Chatham Phoenix Trust Co.,
234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1st Dep't 1932); Hoskin
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reservation of a testamentary power of appointment in itself
is not controlling in ascertaining the settlor's intention to
create a remainder, if from the presence of other factors
the courts are able to find the intention to reserve a rever-
sion.
In those jurisdictions where the doctrine of worthier
title is held to be simply a rule of construction, there is an
obvious solution of the problem of how to avoid litigation of
the question of the settlor's intent. A clear statement by
the draftsman that the intent is to retain a reversion or to
create a remainder would preclude questions on this score.
Obviously the same expedient would be of utility too in juris-
dictions giving the doctrine no effect whatsoever, since the
ultimate question there remains one of intent. The Indiana
draftsman thus has it in his power conclusively to prevent
the question of intent from being seriously challenged.
The moral in New York's story is that the doctrine of
worthier title has no utility whatsoever in the field of trusts.
Even when relegated to the status of a rule of construction,
the doctrine has become encrusted with the gloss of so many
judicial applications that the problem of finding the true
intent of a particular settlor is hindered rather than fur-
thered. Nor has there been any countervailing gain; the
quest for some degree of certainty has been unsuccessful.
For New York, the solution to its vexatious problem seems
to be the total abandonment of the doctrine of worthier title,
since it is improbable that it will ever be restored to the
force of a rule of property. Although abandonment could be
achieved by judicial interpretation, the drafters of the Uni-
form Property Act 3' have provided a statute whose adoption
would achieve that result. For Indiana, there will be no
problem to solve if its courts are diligent to avoid decisions
or implications which may admit of future inferences that
the doctrine is applicable to the law of trusts.
v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 258, 123 N. Y.
Supp. 994 (2nd Dep't 1910).
31. Section 15 of the act, as approved by the commissioners on uni-
form state laws, and the American Law Institute provides:
"When any property is limited, in an otherwise effective convey-
ance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin
of the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more prior
interests in favor of a person or persons in existence, such con-
veyance operates in favor of such heirs or next of kin by purchase
and not by descent." Nebraska has adopted the Uniform Prop-
erty Act. REv. STATUTES OF NEBRASKA § 76-114 (1943).
298 [Vol. 24
